回复: 关于时体的否定形式的问题
Aspect is in fact far from being such a simple static concept as you may have imagined on the basis of limited reading of Quirk et al and Lyons, as can be seen in part of section 3.1 Definitional issues of my 2004 book.
While aspect has been the subject of much research, defining aspect can be surprisingly difficult (cf. Santos 1996; O’Brien 1997). As Holisky (1981:128) comments “[t]here are almost as many definitions for aspect as there are linguists who have used it.” Consequently our first task in this chapter is to consider the key elements of aspect in order to produce a definition of the term which, while being of use to this book, is also situated in the broad body of research on aspect.
Aspect as a concept has developed over time, and can roughly be typified as one of two things. The first approach to aspect is intimately related to the origin of the term. The term ‘aspect’ can be tracked back to Grech (1827), who first used the Russian term vid “view” in his Russian Grammar (cf. Klein 1994:27). The Russian term was translated into French as aspect and borrowed by English (cf. Lyons 1977:705). The origin of the term shows that aspect is originally perspectival,i.e. concerned with the viewpoint or perspective the speaker takes in looking at a situation. A heavily quoted definition typical of this vein of research is given by Comrie (1976:3): “aspects are different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation.” Of course, Comrie is neither the first nor the last linguist to approach aspect in this way. Kruisinga (1931:221), for example, suggested that aspects “express whether the speaker looks upon an action in its entirety, or with special reference to some part.” More recently, Johnson (1981:152) defined aspect as “reference to one of the temporally distinct phases in the evolution of an event through time.”
However, a later view of aspect developed which saw the first view as, at best, a partial account of aspect. Linguists came to realise that the internal temporal structures of situations also contribute to aspectual meanings and so the term aspect broadened to include the internal temporal features of situations, i.e. whether a situation is dynamic or stative, durative or punctual, and telic or atelic. Dynamic vs. stative, durative vs. punctual, and telic vs. atelic are three important oppositions of semantic features closely related to the temporal structure of a situation. These three binary features are widely used for aspectual classification in the literature.[1] They correspond to [±dynamic], [±durative] and [±telic] in this book (see section 3.2). While the meanings of dynamicity and durativity are self-evident, it is sufficient for the moment to note that telicity is related to a natural final endpoint.
The classification of lexical verbs (i.e. ‘aspectual class’, cf. Schilder 1997:8) based on their temporal properties is actually what the German term Aktionsart “kind of action” typically covers. The term Aktionsart in this sense was introduced by Agrell (1908), though it had been used before by Streitberg (1889) in a quite different sense, i.e. roughly like ‘aspect’ in its original sense (cf. Klein 1994:17, 225).
While not necessarily using the terms ‘aspect’ and ‘Aktionsart’, the distinction is apparent in the opposition of grammatical vs. lexical aspect (cf. Siewierska 1991:116; Olsen 1997; Bickel 1997:115; Hsieh 2001:234), subjective vs. objective aspect (cf. Smith 1983:480, 493ff; Kruisinga 1931:232-233; Dahl 1981:83), aspect vs. character (Kruisinga 1931:230-237), aspectual class vs. aspect form (Johnson 1981:153), primary vs. secondary aspect (Galton 1997), procedural characteristics vs. situational focus (Bach 1985:145; cf. Brinton 1988:257), viewpoint aspect vs. situation aspect (Smith 1983, 1991, 1997) and aspectual class vs. grammatical aspect (de Swart 1998). The Aktionsart of English verbs has generally not been the subject of study in traditional grammar and has only recently been studied in linguistic accounts of English verbs (cf. Brinton 1988:5). More recently, however, Aktionsart has gained prominence in aspect scholarship. Some authors even go to the extreme of using the term aspect to refer to Aktionsart only. For example, Jacobson (1971:130-147) suggests that aspect “deals with temporal values inherent in the activity or state itself.”
The two sets of definitions discussed above actually represent two different notions. Unfortunately they share the same name, which inevitably leads to terminological confusion. This confusion is widely recognised (see Comrie 1976:1; Friedrich 1974: S2-3, S6-9; Brinton 1988:4-5; inter alia), and can lead to “aspect, Aktionsart, and even tense terms...[being]...used interchangeably” (Brinton 1988:4).
The lack of terminological consistency in the discussion of aspect makes reviewing research on aspect a very challenging task. For example, the distinction between aspect and Aktionsart is often ignored or blurred, or made in different ways (cf. Comrie 1976:67n). Consider the three “basic aspect categories” proposed by Friedrich (1974:S36): (a) durative, continuative, imperfective, etc.; (b) punctual, completive, perfective, etc.; (c) stative, perfect, etc. Similar views are also found in Holisky (1981), Hopper (1979), Li, Thompson & Thompson (1982) and Decker (1998).
Friedrich uses the term aspect to cover the classical meaning of the term, but also Aktionsart. In his model, ‘punctual’ equals ‘perfective’ and ‘durative’ equals ‘imperfective’. But this is decidedly not true. As will be discussed at greater length later in sections 2.4 and 3.2, the durative/punctual distinction is clearly related to Aktionsart, whereas the perfective/imperfective distinction is clearly related to aspect in its original sense. For example, a durative situation like John crying and a punctual situation like John coughing can be presented both perfectively (John cried and John coughed) and imperfectively (John was crying and John was coughing). Those linguists who have been mindful of the aspect/Aktionsart distinction have not necessarily agreed upon how to distinguish the two. For the purpose of the work presented here, aspect subsumes both the perfective/imperfective distinction and Aktionsart. However, as will become apparent later, the subcomponents of aspect are treated differently by us, unlike for example, Friedrich (ibid), who treated perfective/imperfective and Aktionsart as though they were almost synonymous.
While Comrie (1976) and Kruisinga (1931) explicitly define aspect as different perspectives for presenting situations, Jacobson (1973) uses the term to refer to the internal temporal structures of situations, Smith (1991, 1997) does not accept this opposition. Rather, her definition is inclusive of both: “Aspect is the semantic domain of the temporal structure of situations and their presentation” (Smith 1991:3, 1997:1). According to Smith, the internal temporal structure and the perspectives from which situations are presented are two separate but equally important components which interact to determine aspectual meanings. In Smith’s model, the first component of aspect, ‘situation aspect’, concerns the internal temporal features of ‘idealised situations’ (Smith 1997:17) such as [±dynamic], [±durative] and [±telic] (see section 3.2). Different combinations of these temporal features form different ‘situation types’ (ibid:17). The second component is what Smith calls ‘viewpoint aspect’ (ibid:60), which “enables the speaker to present the event talked about from a particular temporal perspective” (Smith 1988:230). For example, perfective viewpoints focus on a situation as a whole while imperfective viewpoints focus only on part of a situation.
[1] In the literature, the word aspectual is sometimes found to be used as a term covering both viewpoint or perspectival aspect and Aktionsart (e.g. Brinton 1988:4). However, in this book, we will use this word only as the adjectival form of aspect.