语料库语言学中如何看待competence和performance的区分？
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What is linguistics about?
It has been argued that linguistics is “the study of abstract systems of knowledge idealized out of language as actually experienced”, i. e. “idealized internalized I-language” (Widdowson 2000, 6). If linguistics is defined as such, we must admit that any linguistic analysis involving performance data (i. e. “E-language”) has nothing to do with “linguistics” and should claim no place in “linguistics” at all (cf. Leech 2000, 685). The assumption underlying Widdowson’s definition is Chomsky’s (1965; 1986) claim that competence can be separated from performance to be studied alone. But can the two be separated?
The competence vs. performance divide is rooted in the hypothesis that grammar is autonomous within the human mind. Generative grammarians argue that our use of language (performance, E-language) cannot reflect our internal knowledge of language (competence, I-language), because of the constraints in naturally occurring language. Performance errors have been likened to abnormal conditions like tiredness and drunkenness in human communication (e. g. Radford 1997, 2). Only the internal grammar, which is based on native intuitions and not polluted by performance constraints, is said to be part of competence. The corollary of this argument is the sharp distinction between langue and parole (Saussure 1916 [1966]), between performance and competence (Chomsky 1965), and between grammar and usage (Newmeyer 2003). Nevertheless, this dichotomy is arguably over-stated. Evidence from recent research in psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, and biology shows that the hypothesis of an autonomous grammar, which underlies the sharp distinction between competence and performance, is unsustainable (see Shei 2004 for a review). Rather, grammar is constantly shaped by culture (or environmental factors) and interpersonal interactions. In de Beaugrande’s (1997, 302) words, “performance can crucially determine the development and quality of competence”. On the other hand, performance does not spring from nowhere it is a natural and actual product of competence. Clearly, as Leech (1992, 108) observes, “the putative gulf between competence and performance has been overemphasized”.
Given the nature of this interdependence, the Chomskyan linguists’ practice of forcing a sharp distinction between competence and performance is simply misleading in that it is in essence merely an “idealization of language for the sake of simplicity” (Abney 1996, 11). In doing so, real language is replaced by idealized language which does not exist but which purports to sustain an explanation of language (cf. de Beaugrande 1997) while attested language data is denied a place in theory building. In the dialectic view of the relationship between competence and performance, therefore, the assertion is simply unsustainable that performance “cannot constitute the subject-matter of linguistics” (Chomsky 1965, 20), because competence is not directly accessible and our only gateway to it is through performance (cf. Meyer/Nelson 2006). Linguistics is in fact concerned with what language really is as reflected by our knowledge, as well as use, of language. Just as Kennedy (1998, 270) argues: “Furthermore, description of the system we use is not the only legitimate goal of the study of language. The linguistic system is both derived from and instantiated by specific instances of use. It is thus perfectly legitimate to describe language both in terms of the system we use and our use of this system and for the description thus to encompass language as possibility as well as probability of use”.
What is linguistics about?
It has been argued that linguistics is “the study of abstract systems of knowledge idealized out of language as actually experienced”, i. e. “idealized internalized I-language” (Widdowson 2000, 6). If linguistics is defined as such, we must admit that any linguistic analysis involving performance data (i. e. “E-language”) has nothing to do with “linguistics” and should claim no place in “linguistics” at all (cf. Leech 2000, 685). The assumption underlying Widdowson’s definition is Chomsky’s (1965; 1986) claim that competence can be separated from performance to be studied alone. But can the two be separated?
The competence vs. performance divide is rooted in the hypothesis that grammar is autonomous within the human mind. Generative grammarians argue that our use of language (performance, E-language) cannot reflect our internal knowledge of language (competence, I-language), because of the constraints in naturally occurring language. Performance errors have been likened to abnormal conditions like tiredness and drunkenness in human communication (e. g. Radford 1997, 2). Only the internal grammar, which is based on native intuitions and not polluted by performance constraints, is said to be part of competence. The corollary of this argument is the sharp distinction between langue and parole (Saussure 1916 [1966]), between performance and competence (Chomsky 1965), and between grammar and usage (Newmeyer 2003). Nevertheless, this dichotomy is arguably over-stated. Evidence from recent research in psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, and biology shows that the hypothesis of an autonomous grammar, which underlies the sharp distinction between competence and performance, is unsustainable (see Shei 2004 for a review). Rather, grammar is constantly shaped by culture (or environmental factors) and interpersonal interactions. In de Beaugrande’s (1997, 302) words, “performance can crucially determine the development and quality of competence”. On the other hand, performance does not spring from nowhere it is a natural and actual product of competence. Clearly, as Leech (1992, 108) observes, “the putative gulf between competence and performance has been overemphasized”.
Given the nature of this interdependence, the Chomskyan linguists’ practice of forcing a sharp distinction between competence and performance is simply misleading in that it is in essence merely an “idealization of language for the sake of simplicity” (Abney 1996, 11). In doing so, real language is replaced by idealized language which does not exist but which purports to sustain an explanation of language (cf. de Beaugrande 1997) while attested language data is denied a place in theory building. In the dialectic view of the relationship between competence and performance, therefore, the assertion is simply unsustainable that performance “cannot constitute the subject-matter of linguistics” (Chomsky 1965, 20), because competence is not directly accessible and our only gateway to it is through performance (cf. Meyer/Nelson 2006). Linguistics is in fact concerned with what language really is as reflected by our knowledge, as well as use, of language. Just as Kennedy (1998, 270) argues: “Furthermore, description of the system we use is not the only legitimate goal of the study of language. The linguistic system is both derived from and instantiated by specific instances of use. It is thus perfectly legitimate to describe language both in terms of the system we use and our use of this system and for the description thus to encompass language as possibility as well as probability of use”.